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[Crim. No. 4922. In Bank. Jan. 25, 1949.) 
'THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. HARLAN C. BEMIS et aI., 
~: Defendants; DONALD E. HUDSON, Appellant. 
~}.r·, .. 
~'[1] Criminal Law-Instructions - CautionalT Instructions - Ac-
~ . complices.-In a burglary C:l.Se, it was not elTor to fnil to give 
~:' an instrur.tion that the testimony of an accomplice should be 
.~: viell'ed with distrust when: statements made by the accomplico 
J to the officers were admissible only to the extent that defend-
'.: .... '. ant admitted their truth, and where they were admitted as 
Ii' adoptiv~ admissions of defendant rather than as testimony of 
~, an accomplice. 
,~[S] Id.-Instructions-CautionalT Instructions-Admissions. - In 
i a burglary case, the court erred in failing on its own motion 
.t' to instruct that evidence of the oral admissions of defendant 
~._ ought to be viewed with caution, and it W8&l immatc·rio.1 
~.' whether the admissions amounted to confessions. (Code Civ. 
p;_~ . Proc., § 2061, subd. 4.) 
'.(3&, 3b] Id. - Appea1- Reversible Error - Instructions. - In a 
burglary case, the failure to give an instruction that evidence 
of the oral admissions of defendant ought to be viewed with 
caution resulted in a miscarriage of justice, where such instruc-
., tiou related specifically to the manner in which thtl jury were 
. ~to view the only evidence that connected deftlndant with the 
.' crime, and where it could not be said that a di1ferent .verdict .. 
. . would have been improbable I had the instruction boon given. 
, '1 Id.-Instructions - CautionarJ Instructions - AdmissioDs • ....,. 
, The cautionary instruction that evideDC8 of oral admissions is 
to be viewed with caution is designed to aid the jury in deter-
. minmg whether an admission or confession was in fact made . 
. [1] Sec 8 CaLJur. 303; 53 Am.Jv. 483. 
:[2] See 8 CaLJur. 305; 63 Am.Jv. 48L 
.. ~ Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 688, [2,4] Criminal 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angl!les County and from an order denying a new trial. 
Ch:l1'lcs W. Fricke, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for burglary. Judgment of conviction of second 
degree burglary, reversed. 
Robert H. Green for Appellant. 
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, and Howard S. Goldin, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendants Don:lld Hudson and Harlan 
Bemis were jointly charged with two counts of burglary. 
Bemis pleaded guilty to one of the counts, and Hud!loJ1 was 
tried by a jury and convicted on orie count of burglary of the 
seeond degree. The second count was dismissed &t the close 
of the trial for lack of evidence. Defendant appeals from the 
judgment and order denying his motion for a neW trial. 
Sometime during the evening of June 12, 1947, or the early 
morning of June 13th,a coffee shop at 754 South Union Street 
in Los Angeles was burglarized. Mrs. Eleanor Beck, the pro-
prietress, testified that when she arrived in the morning to 
open her shop she found the front door open about an inch. 
The lock had been knocked off, and approximately $125, some 
whi.'1key, keys, and a pair of shears were missing from the shop. 
To connect defendant Hudson with this burglary the prose-
cution relied entirely on the oral admissions of defendant made 
to Officers Eggenweiler and Hooper while defendant was 
under arrest. I , 
Officer Eggenweiler testified as follows: "We had this blue 
canvas bag here and the contents in the room where we were 
talking to the defendant, and I had asked him the question, 
'Had you evcr been in the Portsmouth Hotel on South Hill 
Street acrollS from Pershing Square" And he stated, 'Yes.' 
I asked hito when and he said, 'Just a short time ago. ' I asked 
him if he had seen Bemis there, who was Il co-defendant before, 
and he st.ated, 'Yes.' I then took a large screw driver, "ith 
a light colored handle on it, out of the bag and asked him if 
he had ever seen that before, and he st.'\ted yes, thllt br bad 
given that to Bemis in the Sta.te of Arizon9. some time~. . . . 
We then had a moneyhag there, And I told bim I h:ld taL1ced 
to Bemis, who st:1ted t.hat he hl\d gone out onto Wl~ Ninth 
Street aud had gone out on South Union, and while on UuiOIl 
) 
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- Avenuc that he had stood out on the sidewalk in front of 754 
South Union-he didn't know the address, but hc just knew 
. th.: place-and that Hudson had used the large screw driver 
and had forced the door open by prying on the hasp of the 
door. I said Bemis had admitted doing these jobs, this one, and 
thc one on Ninth Street, that he had connected Hudson with it, 
and he stated-" Question. "Now, you are talking about 
:Hudsonf" Answer. "I am talking about Hudson now; I 
asked him what he had to say about that, or some question 
like that, and he said that he was with Bemis, but that he didn't 
bve any part in the burglary which was committed on Ninth 
Street. . . . He said he went to this place on South Union, 
that Bemis did stand out ill front and he went in it. 
l" Officer Hooper and myself then drove out to South Union, 
StOPped ill front of the cafe, asked him to point it out, and he 
iaid that was the cafe he went into. He said he used this 
i'rt::e screw driver to force the door open and went in; that 
. 'je' stole soIDe whiskey and stole-or took the money and 
alaothat there was some keya. He stated that he later threw 
d,ae bunch of keys away." OfBcer Eggenweiler_ further testi-
led that Hudson had identified a moneybag as the one he 
t),ok from the cafe and the bag of tools as a kit he and Bemis 
h.d used on di1ferent jobs in Arizona and Texas. Officer 
ooper's testimony in reference to the conversation with de-
~dant was substantially the same as Officer Eggenweilcr's. 
be ~ of tools was found in Bemis' hotel room. Both of-
eers testified that Hudson spoke voluntarily in answer to their 
. ucstions; that they used no force and made no threats or 
ibmises . 
. , efcndant Hudson testified in his own behalf. He denied 
'ving taken part in either burglary or having gone with 
. ~.;~ to either of the shops that were burglarized. He stated 
_,:Jhe would have·made no statement to the officers if they 
. not first threatened and then beaten him. He testified 
t after he was beaten he said: "Well, I guess I am guilty 
~:'you people won't believe me when I tell you where I was 
'd you won't give me a chance to prove my story, I guess I 
~' gtillty." He denied having identified Mrs. Beck's shop. 
though he admitted that he knew Bemis and had been with 
i' ".in Texas and had met him in Los Angeles and knew where 
'~ed, he denied ever having been to Bemis' hotel room or 
~g kept any of his belongings there. He denied having 
t~tthe officers that he and Bemis had the bag together ill 
.>' and Arizona. He stated that he told the officers that 
) 
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Rpmis had brought the bag up to J.JOS Ange)('!> but that hI'. 
Hudson, had never R('en the toolR in thp Illig h ... fnrfl t.hl' ofli('(,1"N 
showed them to him. 
[1] Appellant contends that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error by failing to give of its own motion instruc. 
tions that the testimony of an accomplice ought to be vIewed 
with distrust and that evidence of the oral admissions of a 
party should be viewed with caution. He contends that al· 
though Bemis did not take the stand, his hearsay statements 
testified to by the two officers should be considered as testimony 
of an accomplice and that hence an accomplice instruction 
should have been given. Any statements Bemis mad~ to the 
officers were admissible, however, only to the extent that Hud-
50n admitted their truth. (People v. Simmons, 28 Ca1.2d 699. 
712 [172 P.2d 18] ; People v. Lapara, 181 Cal. 66, 71 [183 P. 
545] ; People v. Teshara, 134 Cal. 542,544 [66 P. 798] ; 4 WiP.'-
more on Evidence, § 1072.) They were not indl.'pt·ndent e\i· 
dence that Hudson committed a burglary. (People v. Sim-
mons, supra, 28 Cal.2d 699, 717; People v. Yeager, 19·; Cal. 
452, 486 [229 P. 40] ; People v. Lew Fat, 189 Cal. 242. 244 
[207 P. 881] ; People v. Ong MonFoo, 182 Cal. 697, i03 [189 P. 
690] ; People v. Lapara, supra, 181 Cal. 66, 71.) The jury 
thus should have considered Bemis' l:>tatemcnts only ns admis-
sions of Hudson if they found he had admitt('d thpir truth. 
Since they were admitted as adoptive admissions of Hudson 
rather than as testimony of Bemis, it was not error to fail to 
give an instruction that the testimony of an accomplice should 
be viewed with distrust. 
[2] The trial court did err, however, by failing to instruct 
the jury that evidence of the oral admissions of defendant 
ought to be viewed with caution. The dangers inherent in 
the use of such evidence are well recognized by courts and 
text writers. (People I v. Thomas, 25 C,!1.2d 880, 890 [156 
P.2d 7 J ; People v. Koenig, 29 Cal.2d 87, 94 [173 P.2d 1]; 
People v. Cornett, ante, p. 33 [198 P.2d 877]; People v. 
Wardrip, 141 Cal. 229, 232 [74 P. 744] ; Kauffman v. :Jlaie.r, 
94 Cal. 269, 283 [29 P. 481, 18 L.R.A. 124] ;.Conger v. White, 
69 CaI.App.2d 28, 38 [158 P.2d 415]; Damas v. People, 62 
Colo. 418, 421 [163 P. 289, L.R.A. 1917D 591]; Thomas v. 
State, 186 Md. 446, 452 [47 A.2d 43, 167 A.L.R. 390] ; Sylvain 
v. Page, 84 Mont.424, 438 [276 P. 16, 63 A.L.R. 528] ; Kut· 
chcra v. Graft, 191 Iowa 1200, 1206 [184 N.W. 297, 26 A.L.R. 
1257] ; Commonwealth v. Giovanetti, 341 Pa. 345, 362 rt9 A.2d 
119]; ColU", v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 815, 821 [96 S.E. 
) 
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826] ; 3 Wigmore on Evidence, § 866; 7 Wigmore on Evid~nce, 
§§ 2070, 2071. 2094; 2 Wharton. Criminal Evidence, § 6-1:3.) 
"It is It familiar rule that verbal admissions should bt' receiv~d 
with caution and sUbjected to careful scrutiny. as no class of 
t"videnet" is more subject to error or abuse. Witnesses having 
: the" best motives are generally unable to state the euct lan-
guage of an admission, and arc liable. by the omission or thc 
'changing of words, to convey a false impression of tb~ lan-
·guage used. No other class of testimony affords such tempta· 
Inoris or opportunities for unscrupulous wituesses to torture 
·the facts or commit open perjury, as it is often impossible to 
"eontradict their testimony at all, or at least by any other wit· 
!ness than the party himself." (2 Jones, Commentaries on the 
'Law of Evirlence, 620.) It was undoubtedly such considera-
'nons thllt led the Legislature to make the admitting of extra-
" judicilll admissions into evidence conditionnl on the riving 
of a cantion:lry instruction. (See People v. Dail. 22 Ca1.2d 
".642,655 [140 P.2d 828].) Section 2061 of the Code of Civil 
;'i.:JrnlCel(111lre provides that the jury are "to bc instructed by the 
tourt on al1 proper occasions: 4. Thll,t the testimony of an 
... ,,'v ... y .. '"'' o11ght to be viewed with distrust. and the evidence 
admissions of a party with caution," and it is DOW 
t hat it is c:rror for the trial court not to give such in-
in proper eases. (People v. Koenig, supra, 29 Cal. 
87, 94; People v. Oornett, supra, ante, p. 33 [198 P.2d 
People v. Hamilton, ante, p. 45 [198 P.2d 8731; sec 
v. Dat7., supra, 22 Cal.2d 642, 656; Peop1,e v. Macias, 
71, 80 [174 P.2d 895].) It is immaterial 
lIi .. rhl"th~!l' the admissions amount to confessions. (Sec People 
Koenig, supra, 29 Ca1.2d 87, 91; Damas v. People, supra, 
·Colo. 418, 421; Thomas v. State, supra, 186 Md. 446, 452; 
aLron,mcnztADealth v. Giovanetti, supra, 341 Pa. 345. 362; 3 Wig-
on Evidence, § 866; 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, 
_,V'Z'tI.); 
:[3a;] It is contended tbat the failure to give the instruction 
...... '."·nnT prejudicial, on the grounds that the instruction stntes 
_'n"~"A commonplace, which the jury woUld know without any 
Hidl"I1~,+in, ... on th,· subject, that the admissions amounted to 
and the jury were properly instructed th'\t they 
IUsre~ard the ane~ed confession if they found it was not 
vohmtnrily. and that thp defendant admitted at the 
that hc had made some of the incriminating statements 
by the officera. 
) 
) 
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In Hirshfeld v. DaM, 193 Cal. 142, 160 [223 P. 451], the 
eourt, after collecting and discussing the cases, said: "It is 
clear from the L'lter decisions that subdivision 4 [of Code Civ. 
Proc., § 2061] is unconstitutional, but th:lt "'here an instruc-
tion is proposed in the language of that subdiviRion. the giv-
ing or the refusal to give it will not be held to be prejudici:LI 
error; and this upon the reasoning that it st!\tcs a mere com-
monplnce mntter within the general knowledge of the jury." 
Thi.'i re.-uwning was rejected, ho\vever, in People v. Dail, supra, 
22 Cal.2d 642, where the court, after overruling the Hirshfc1d 
. e.'L'IC nnd holding subdivision 4 constitutional, flaid: "The re-
snIt of our present decision is that such instructions are necea-
S:lrY in a proper case and the failure so to instruct may be 
reversible error." (People v. Dail, supra, 22 Ca1.2d 612, 656.) 
To hold that the instructions required by subdivision 4 state 
mere commonplaces within the general knowledge of the jury 
is tantamount to holding that the failure to give them in 
proper cases is not error. Such a holding would be contrary 
to the clear mandate of the statute and the many recent cases 
interpreting it. (P~ v. CorM", supra, ante, pp. 33, 40; 
People v. HamiLto'l&, apra, ante, pp. 45, 51; PeopZe v. 
Koenig, suprtJ, 29 cat.2d 87, 94; People v. Dail, supra, 22 
Cal.2d 642, 656; People v. Macias, supra, 77 Cal.App.2d 71, 
80; Freeman·v. Nickerson, 77 Cal.App.2d 40, 63 [174 P.2d 
688]; Conger v. White, supra, 69 Cal.App.2d 28, 38.) The 
Legislatnre has made it clear that it cannot be assumed that 
. the jury will have in mind the considerations that may affect 
the weight or credibility of the testimony of an accomplice 
or the evidence of the oral admissions of a party. 
['1 The calitionary instruction that evidence of oral ad-
missions is to be viewed with caution is designed to aid the jury 
in determining whethcr an admission or confession was in faet 
made. (See 3 Wigmore on Evidence, § 866.) This issue is 
distinct from the issue whether n confession, assuming it w:ua 
madu, was voluntary. The jury h:Ld to decide not only whether 
defendant m:Lde a confession, but also if he did, whether he 
mnde it voluntarily. The instruction to disregard an involun-
tary confession told the jury only that they must decide the 
lntter issue if they found against defend:m.t on the former, 
but did not suggest to them thnt they must view with caution . 
the evidence introduced to prove that defendant spoke the 
words .. 
[3b] Defendant testi1led at the trial that he h:Ld t.'Ilked 
to thc officers, but his version of the conversation agreed with 
) 
) 
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theirs only in that he admitted that he had told them"that ho 
knew Bemis. Tho jury were fnccd with the difficulf task of 
deciding which version was corrcct. The burdcn was on thc 
prosecution to prove defendant guilty beyond a rCllSonablo 
doubt. In determining whether the prosecution met that 
burden, the jury should have had before them the cautionnry 
instruction required by the statute. This instruction,rclated 
specifically to the manner in whieh the jury were to view the 
only evidence that connected defendant with the crime, and 
since we cannot say that a difrerent vcrdict would have been 
improbable had the cautionary instruction been given, the 
failure to give the instruction resulted in a miscarriage of 
justice. 
The judgment and the order denying the motion for a new 
trial arc reversed. 
: . _ Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Cartel', J., and Schauer, J., eon-
curred. 
SPENCE, 1.-1 dissent. 
The sole ground upon which the majority opinion bRSCS 
the reversal is the failure of. the trial court to instruct the 
jury, upon its own motion, that evidenee of the oral admis-
sions of the defendant ought to be vi~wcd with caution. 
· . While it hIlS been held in recent cases that such instruction 
. should be given on propcr occasions, this appears to be the 
first case in which a judgment has been reversed solely because 
of the trial court's failure so to instruct. In my opinion, 
when the sole error consists of the failure to give such instruc-
· tion, such error alone would seldom, if over, warrant a rever-
faal for,M has bc~repeatodly . said, the instruction statL'S a 
commonplace Olf matter of common knowledge which 
jury would know without any instruction on the subject. 
· '(Peopu v. Wardrip, 141 Cal. 229, 233 [74 P. 744] ; G081 v . 
• lSretQ.~r Terra Cotta It Pottery Works, 148 Cal. 155, 156 [83 P. 
; People v. Baber, 168 Cal. 316, 320 [143 P. 317]; People 
Komig, 29 Cal.2d 87, 94 [173 P.2d 1}; Pe()ple v. Hewitt, 
Cal.App. 426, 440 [248 P. 1021]; People v. Hanse1I, 130 
;.':.\,j ........ l2o.pJ!'. 217, 220 [19 P.2d 993] ; People v. Burnette, 39 C:U. 
A.}I'}I .... u 215, 231 [102 P.2d 799] ; Freeman v. NickcrBon, 77 
i..;"'''i&.A.;~}I ••• u 40, 62 [174 P.2d 688].) 
present case the "admissions" of defendant consti-
a detailed confession of his aetivc pnrticip3tion in the 
for which he was convicted. Defendant took thu witness 
